Quantum Cryptography uses the counter-intuitive properties of Quantum Mechanics for performing cryptographic tasks in a secure and reliable way. The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important types of attacks: collective attacks and joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a modified BB84 protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing is done in both the z and the x bases, against collective attacks. The proof follows the framework of a previous paper [1], but it avoids a classical information-theoretical analysis and proves a fully composable security. We show that this modified BB84 protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that it requires more bits for testing.
Introduction
Cryptography is the science of protecting the security and correctness of data against adversaries. One of the most important cryptographic problems is the problem of encryption -namely, of transferring a secret message from a sender to a receiver. Two main encryption methods are used today:
1. In symmetric-key cryptography, the same secret key is used for both the sender and the receiver: the sender uses the secret key for encrypting his or her message, and the receiver uses the same secret key for decrypting the message. Examples of symmetric-key ciphers include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [2] , the older Data Encryption Standard (DES), and one-time pad ("Vernam cipher").
attacks allowed by quantum physics. [1] improved the security proof of Biham, Boyer, Brassard, van de Graaf, and Mor [10] against collective attacks, by using some techniques of Biham, Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury [11] (that proved security against joint attacks). In this paper, too, we restrict the analysis to collective attacks, because security against collective attacks is conjectured (and, in some security notions, proved [12, 13] ) to imply security against joint attacks. In addition, proving security against collective attacks is much simpler than proving security against joint attacks. Other QKD protocols, either similar to BB84 or ones that use different approaches, have also been suggested, and in some cases have also been proven fully secure. In particular, the "three-state protocol" [14] uses only three quantum states, and it has been proven secure [15, 16, 17] ; the "classical Bob" protocol [18] is a two-way protocol such that only Alice has quantum capabilities and Bob has only classical capabilities, and it has been proven robust [18] and secure [19] ; and the "classical Alice" protocol [20] is similar to "classical Bob" with Alice being the classical participant instead of Bob, and it has been proven robust [21] .
The above QKD protocols are all "Discrete-Variable" protocols. Two other classes of QKD protocols, "Continuous-Variable" protocols and "Distributed-Phase-Reference" protocols, have also been suggested; their security proofs are still weaker than the security proofs of "Discrete-Variable" protocols (see [22] for details).
QKD protocols can be used as a subroutine (secure key distribution) of more complicated cryptographic protocols. In other words, they can be integrated into a system in order to improve its security: see [23] for more details about this integration.
In many QKD protocols, including BB84, Alice and Bob exchange several types of bits (encoded as quantum systems, usually qubits): INFO bits, that are secret bits shared by Alice and Bob and are used for generating the final key (via classical processes of error correction and privacy amplification); and TEST bits, that are publicly exposed by Alice and Bob (by using the classical channel) and are used for estimating the error rate. In BB84, each bit is sent from Alice to Bob in a random basis (the z basis or the x basis).
In this paper, we extend the analysis of BB84 done in [1] and prove the security of a QKD protocol we shall name BB84-INFO-z. This protocol is almost identical to BB84, except that all its INFO bits are in the z basis. In other words, the x basis is used only for testing. The bits are thus partitioned into three disjoint sets: INFO, TEST-Z, and TEST-X. The sizes of these sets are arbitrary (n INFO bits, n z TEST-Z bits, and n x TEST-X bits).
We note that, while this paper follows a line of research that mainly discusses a specific approach of security proof for BB84 and similar protocols (this approach, notably, considers finite-key effects and not only the asymptotic error rate), many other approaches have also been suggested: see for example [24, 25, 12, 26] .
In contrast to the line of research adopted here (of [8, 9, 10, 11, 1] ), in which a classical information-theoretical analysis caused problems with composability (see definition in [12] and in Subsection 1.1), in this paper we suggest a method to prove a fully composable security: we calculate the trace distance between any two density matrices Eve may hold, instead of calculating the classical mutual information between Eve and the final key (as done in those previous papers). This method is implemented in this paper for proving the fully composable security of BB84-INFO-z against collective attacks; it also directly applies to the BB84 security proof in [1] against collective attacks, proving the fully composable security of BB84 against collective attacks. It may be extended in the future to show that the BB84 security proof of [11] proves the fully composable security of BB84 against joint attacks.
The "qubit space", H 2 , is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space. The states |0 0 , |1 0 form an orthonormal basis of H 2 , called "the computational basis" or "the z basis". The states |0 1
form another orthonormal basis of H 2 , called "the x basis". Those two bases are said to be conjugate bases.
In this paper, we denote bit strings (of t bits, with t ≥ 0 being some integer) by a bold letter (e.g., i = i 1 . . . i t with i 1 , . . . , i t ∈ {0, 1}); and we refer to those bit strings as elements of F t 2 -that is, as elements of a t-dimensional vector space over the field F 2 = {0, 1}, where addition of two vectors corresponds to a XOR operation between them. The number of 1-bits in a bit string s is denoted by |s|, and the Hamming distance between two strings s and s is d H (s, s ) = |s + s |.
Security Definitions of Quantum Key Distribution
Originally, a QKD protocol was defined to be secure if the (classical) mutual information between Eve's information and the final key, maximized over all the possible attack strategies and measurements by Eve, is exponentially small in the number of qubits, N. Examples of security proofs of BB84 that use this security definition are [24, 11, 25] . Those security proofs used the observation that one cannot analyze the classical data held by Eve before privacy amplification (as done in [27] ), but must analyze the quantum state held by Eve [28] . In other words, they assumed that Eve could keep her quantum state until the end of the protocol, and only then choose the optimal measurement (based on all the data she observed) and perform the measurement.
Later, it was noticed that this security definition may not be "composable". In other words, the final key is secure if Eve measures the quantum state she holds at the end of the QKD protocol, but the proof does not apply to cryptographic applications (e.g., encryption) of the final key: Eve might gain non-negligible information after the key is used, even though her information on the key itself was negligible. This means that the proof is not sufficient for practical purposes. In particular, those applications may be insecure if Eve keeps her quantum state until Alice and Bob use the key (thus giving Eve some new information) and only then measures.
Therefore, a new notion of "(composable) full security" was defined [29, 26, 12] by using the trace distance between quantum states, following universal composability definitions for non-quantum cryptography [30, 31] . Intuitively, this notion means that the final joint quantum state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the protocol is very close (namely, the trace distance is exponentially small in N) to their final state at the end of an ideal key distribution protocol, that distributes a completely random and secret final key to both Alice and Bob. In other words, if a QKD protocol is secure, then except with an exponentially small probability, one of the two following events happens: the protocol is aborted, or the secret key generated by the protocol is the same as a perfect key that is uniformly distributed (i.e., each possible key having the same probability), is the same for both parties, and is independent of the adversary's information.
Formally, ρ ABE is defined as the final quantum state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the protocol (with Alice's and Bob's states being simply the "classical" states |k A A and |k B B , where k A and k B are bit strings that are the final keys held by Alice and Bob, respectively (note that usually k A = k B ); and with Eve's state including both her quantum probe and the classical information published in the unjammable classical channel); ρ U is defined as the complete mixture of all the possible keys that are the same for Alice and Bob (namely, if the set of possible final keys is K, then ρ U = 1 |K| ∑ k∈K |k A |k B k| A k| B ); and ρ E is defined as the partial trace of ρ ABE over the system AB. For the QKD protocol to be fully (and composably) secure, it is required that
where ε is exponentially small in N. Intuitively, ρ ABE is the actual joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the QKD protocol; ρ U is the ideal final state of Alice and Bob (an equal mixture of all the possible final keys, that is completely uncorrelated with Eve and is the same for Alice and Bob); and ρ E is the state of Eve, uncorrelated with the states of Alice and Bob. Note that cases in which the protocol is aborted are represented by the zero operator: see [12, Subsection 6.1.2] for details. Composable security of many QKD protocols, including BB84, has been proved [29, 26, 12] .
Full Definition of the Protocol "BB84-INFO-z"
Below we formally define all the steps of the BB84-INFO-z protocol, as used in this paper.
1. Before the protocol, Alice and Bob choose some shared (and public) parameters: numbers n, n z , and n x (we denote N n + n z + n x ), error thresholds p a,z and p a,x , an r × n parity check matrix P C (corresponding to a linear error-correcting code C), and an m × n privacy amplification matrix P K (representing a linear keygeneration function). It is required that all the r + m rows of the matrices P C and P K put together are linearly independent. 2. Alice randomly chooses a partition P = (s, z, b) of the N bits by randomly choosing three N-bit strings s, z, b ∈ F N 2 that satisfy |s| = n, |z| = n z , |b| = n x , and |s + z + b| = N. Thus, P partitions the set of indexes {1, 2, ..., N} into three disjoint sets:
• I (INFO bits, where s j = 1) of size n;
• T Z (TEST-Z bits, where z j = 1) of size n z ; and
• T X (TEST-X bits, where b j = 1) of size n x .
3. Alice randomly chooses an N-bit string i ∈ F N 2 and sends the N qubit states |i b 1 1 , |i b 2 2 , . . . , |i b N N , one after the other, to Bob using the quantum channel. Notice that Alice uses the z basis for sending the INFO and TEST-Z bits, and that she uses the x basis for sending the TEST-X bits. Bob keeps each received qubit in quantum memory, not measuring it yet 1 . 4. Alice sends to Bob over the classical channel the bit string b = b 1 . . . b N . Bob measures each of the qubits he saved in the correct basis (namely, when measuring the i-th qubit, he measures it in the z basis if b i = 0, and he measures it in the x basis if b i = 1). The bit string measured by Bob is denoted by i B . If there is no noise and no eavesdropping, then i B = i. 5. Alice sends to Bob over the classical channel the bit string s. The INFO bits (that will be used for creating the final key) are the n bits with s j = 1, while the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits (that will be used for testing) are the n z + n x bits with s j = 0. We denote the substrings of i, b that correspond to the INFO bits by i s and b s , respectively. 6. Alice and Bob both publish the bit values they have for all the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits, and they compare the bit values. If more than n z · p a,z TEST-Z bits are different between Alice and Bob or more than n x · p a,x TEST-X bits are different between them, they abort the protocol. We note that p a,z and p a,x (the pre-agreed error thresholds) are the maximal allowed error rates on the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits, respectively -namely, in each basis (z and x) separately. 7. The values of the remaining n bits (the INFO bits, with s j =1) are kept in secret by Alice and Bob. The bit string of Alice is denoted x = i s , and the bit string of Bob is denoted x B . 8. Alice sends to Bob the syndrome of x (with respect to the error-correcting code C and to its corresponding parity check matrix P C ), that consists of r bits and is defined as ξ = xP T C . By using ξ , Bob corrects the errors in his x B string (so that it is the same as x). 9. The final key consists of m bits and is defined as k = xP T K . Both Alice and Bob compute it.
The protocol is defined similarly to BB84 (and to its description in [1] ), except that it uses the generalized bit numbers n, n z , and n x (numbers of INFO, TEST-Z, and TEST-X bits, respectively); that it uses the partition P = (s, z, b) for dividing the N-bit string i into three disjoint sets of indexes (I, T Z , and T X ); and that it uses two separate thresholds (p a,z and p a,x ) instead of one (p a ).
Proof of Security for the BB84-INFO-z Protocol Against Collective Attacks

The General Collective Attack of Eve
Before the QKD protocol is performed (and, thus, independently of i and P), Eve chooses some collective attack to perform. A collective attack is bitwise: it attacks each qubit separately, by using a separate probe (ancillary state). Each probe is attached by Eve to the quantum state, and Eve saves it in a quantum memory. Eve can keep her quantum probes indefinitely, even after the final key is used by Alice and Bob; and she can perform, at any time of her choice, an optimal measurement of all her probes together, chosen based on all the information she has at the time of the measurement (including the classical information sent during the protocol, and including the information she acquires when Alice and Bob use the key).
Given the j-th qubit |i b j j T j sent from Alice to Bob (1 ≤ j ≤ N), Eve attaches a probe state |0 E E j and applies some unitary operator U j of her choice to the compound system |0 E E j |i b j j T j . Then, Eve keeps to herself (in a quantum memory) the subsystem E j , which is her probe state; and sends to Bob the subsystem T j , which is the qubit sent from Alice to Bob (which may have been modified by her attack U j ).
The most general collective attack U j of Eve on the j-th qubit, represented in the
where
We thus notice that Eve can modify the original product state of the compound sys-
. Eve's attack may thus cause Bob's state to become entangled with her probe. On the one hand, this may give Eve some information on Bob's state; on the other hand, this causes disturbance that may be detected by Bob. The security proof shows that the information obtained by Eve and the disturbance caused by Eve are inherently correlated: this is the basic reason QKD protocols are secure.
Results from [1]
The security proof of BB84-INFO-z against collective attacks is very similar to the security proof of BB84 itself against collective attacks, that was detailed in [1] . Most parts of the proof are not affected at all by the changes made to BB84 to get the BB84-INFO-z protocol (changes detailed in Section 2 of the current paper), because those parts assume fixed strings s and b, and because the attack is collective (so the analysis is restricted to the INFO bits).
Therefore, the reader is referred to the proof in Section 2 and Subsections 3.1 to 3.5 of [1] , that applies to BB84-INFO-z without any changes (except changing the total number of bits, 2n, to N, which does not affect the proof at all), and that will not be repeated here.
We denote the rows of the error-correction parity check matrix P C as the vectors v 1 , . . . , v r in F n 2 , and the rows of the privacy amplification matrix P K as the vectors v r+1 , . . . , v r+m . We also define, for every r , V r Span{v 1 , ..., v r }; and we define d r,m min
For a 1-bit final key k ∈ {0, 1}, we define ρ k to be the state of Eve corresponding to the final key k, given that she knows ξ . Thus,
where ρ b x is Eve's state after the attack, given that Alice sent the INFO bit string x encoded in the bases b = b s . The state ρ k , that is a lift-up of ρ k (which means that ρ k is a partial trace of ρ k ), was also defined in [1] .
In the end of Subsection 3.5 of [1] , it was found that (in the case of a 1-bit final key, i.e., m = 1)
where C I is a random variable whose value is the n-bit string of errors on the n INFO bits; B I is a random variable whose value is the n-bit string of bases of the n INFO bits; b is the bit-flipped string of b = b s ; and d r,1 (and, in general, d r,m ) was defined above. Now, according to [32, Theorem 9.2 and page 407], and using the fact that ρ k is a partial trace of ρ k , we find that 1 2 
From this result and from inequality (6) we deduce that
Bounding the Differences Between Eve's States
We define c i + i B : namely, c is the XOR of the N-bit string i sent by Alice and of the N-bit string i B measured by Bob. For all indexes 1 ≤ l ≤ N, c l = 1 if and only if Bob's l-th bit value is different from the l-th bit sent by Alice. The partition P divides the N bits into n INFO bits, n z TEST-Z bits, and n x TEST-X bits. The corresponding substrings of the error string c are c s (the string of errors on the INFO bits), c z (the string of errors on the TEST-Z bits), and c b (the string of errors on the TEST-X bits). The random variables that correspond to c s , c z , and c b are denoted by C I , C T Z , and C T X , respectively.
We define C I to be a random variable whose value is the string of errors on the INFO bits if Alice had encoded and sent the INFO bits in the x basis (instead of the z basis dictated by the protocol). In those notations, inequality (7) reads as
using the fact that Eve's attack is collective, so the qubits are attacked independently, and, therefore, the errors on the INFO bits are independent of the errors on the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits (namely, of c z and c b ). As explained in [1] , inequality (8) was not derived for the actual attack U = U 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ U N applied by Eve, but for a virtual flat attack (that depends on b and therefore could not have been applied by Eve). That flat attack gives the same states ρ 0 and ρ 1 as given by the original attack U, and it gives a lower (or the same) error rate in the conjugate basis. Therefore, inequality (8) holds for the original attack U, too. This means that, starting from this point, all our results apply to the original attack U rather than to the flat attack.
So far, we have discussed a 1-bit key. We will now discuss a general m-bit key k. We define ρ k to be the state of Eve corresponding to the final key k, given that she knows ξ :
Proposition 1. For any two keys k, k of m bits,
Proof. We define the key k j , for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, to consist of the first j bits of k and the last m − j bits of k. This means that k 0 = k, k m = k , and k j−1 differs from k j at most on a single bit (the j-th bit). First, we find a bound on 1 2 tr | ρ k j−1 − ρ k j |: since k j−1 differs from k j at most on a single bit (the j-th bit, given by the formula x · v r+ j ), we can use the same proof that gave us inequality (8) , attaching the other (identical) key bits to ξ of the original proof; and we find that
where we define d j as d H (v r+ j ,V j ), and V j Span{v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v r+ j−1 , v r+ j+1 , . . . , v r+m }. Now we notice that d j is the Hamming distance between v r+ j and some vector in V j , which means that d j = ∑ r+m i=1 a i v i with a i ∈ F 2 and a r+ j = 0. The properties of Hamming distance assure us that d j is at least d H (v r +1 ,V r ) for some r ≤ r < r + m. Therefore, we find that d r,m = min r≤r <r+m d H (v r +1 ,V r ) ≤ d j .
The result d r,m ≤ d j implies that if | C I | ≥ d j 2 then | C I | ≥ d r,m 2 . Therefore, inequality (11) implies
Now we use the triangle inequality for norms to find
as we wanted.
The value we want to bound is the expected value (namely, the average) of the trace distance between two states of Eve corresponding to two final keys. However, we should take into account that if the test fails, no final key is generated, and the distance between all of Eve's states becomes 0 for any purpose. We thus define the random variable ∆ (p a,z ,p a,x ) Eve (k, k ) for any two final keys k, k :
We need to bound the expected value ∆ (p a,z ,p a,x ) Eve (k, k ) , that is given by:
(In Subsection 3.6 we prove that this is indeed the quantity we need to bound for proving full composability, defined in Subsection 1.1.)
where | C I | n is a random variable whose value is the error rate on the INFO bits if they had been encoded in the x basis, |C T Z | n z is a random variable whose value is the error rate on the TEST-Z bits, and |C T X | n x is a random variable whose value is the error rate on the TEST-X bits.
Proof. We use the convexity of x 2 , namely, the fact that for all {p i } i satisfying p i ≥ 0 and ∑ i p i = 1, it holds that (∑ i p i x i ) 2 ≤ ∑ i p i x 2 i . We find that:
Proof of Security
Following [1] and [11] , we choose matrices P C and P K such that the inequality d r,m 2n > p a,x + ε is satisfied for some ε (we will explain in Subsection 3.7 why this is possible). This means that
We will now prove the right-hand-side of (18) to be exponentially small in n.
As said earlier, the random variable C I corresponds to the bit string of errors on the INFO bits if they had been encoded in the x basis. The TEST-X bits are also encoded in the x basis, and the random variable C T X corresponds to the bit string of errors on those bits. Therefore, we can treat the selection of the indexes of the n INFO bits and the n x TEST-X bits as a random sampling (after the numbers n, n z , and n x and the indexes of the TEST-Z bits have all already been chosen) and use Hoeffding's theorem (that is described in Appendix A of [1] ).
Therefore, for each bit string c 1 . . . c n+n x that consists of the errors in the n + n x INFO and TEST-X bits if the INFO bits had been encoded in the x basis, we apply Hoeffding's theorem: namely, we take a sample of size n without replacement from the population c 1 , . . . , c n+n x (this corresponds to the random selection of the indexes of the INFO bits and the TEST-X bits, as defined above, given that the indexes of the TEST-Z bits have already been chosen). Let X = | C I | n be the average of the sample (this is exactly the error rate on the INFO bits, assuming, again, that the INFO bits had been encoded in the x basis); and let µ =
be the expectancy of X (this is exactly the error rate on the INFO bits and TEST-X bits together). Then |C T X | n x ≤ p a,x is equivalent to (n + n x )µ − nX ≤ n x · p a,x , and, therefore, to n · (X − µ) ≥ n x · (µ − p a,x ). This means that the conditions | C I | n > p a,x + ε and
which implies 1 + n n x (X − µ) > ε, which is equivalent to X − µ > n x n+n x ε. Using Hoeffding's theorem (from Appendix A of [1] ), we get:
Theorem 3. Let us be given δ > 0, R > 0, and, for infinitely many values of n, a family {v n 1 , . . . , v n r n +m n } of linearly independent vectors in F n 2 such that δ < d rn,mn n and m n n ≤ R. Then for any p a,z , p a,x > 0 and ε sec > 0 such that p a,x + ε sec ≤ δ 2 , and for any n, n z , n x > 0 and two m n -bit final keys k, k , the distance between Eve's states corresponding to k and k satisfies the following bound:
In Subsection 3.7 we explain why the vectors required by this Theorem exist. We note that the quantity ∆ (p a,z ,p a,x ) Eve (k, k ) bounds the expected values of the Shannon Distinguishability and of the mutual information between Eve and the final key, as done in [1] and [11] , which is sufficient for proving non-composable security; but it also avoids composability problems: Eve is not required to measure immediately after the protocol ends, but she is allowed to wait until she gets more information. In Subsection 3.6 we use this bound for proving a fully composable security.
Reliability
Security itself is not sufficient; we also need the key to be reliable (namely, to be the same for Alice and Bob). This means that we should make sure that the number of errors on the INFO bits is less than the maximal number of errors that can be corrected by the error-correcting code. We demand that our error-correcting code can correct n(p a,z + ε rel ) errors (we explain in Subsection 3.7 why this demand is satisfied). Therefore, reliability of the final key with exponentially small probability of failure is guaranteed by the following inequality: (as said, C I corresponds to the actual bit string of errors on the INFO bits in the protocol, when they are encoded in the z basis)
This inequality is proved by an argument similar to the one used in Subsection 3.4: the selection of the indexes of the INFO bits and the TEST-Z bits is a random partition of n + n z bits into two subsets of sizes n and n z , respectively (assuming that the indexes of the TEST-X bits have already been chosen), and thus it corresponds to Hoeffding's sampling.
Proof of Fully Composable Security
We now prove that the BB84-INFO-z protocol satisfies the definition of composable security for a QKD protocol: namely, that it satisfies equation (1) presented in Subsection 1.1. We prove that the expression 1 2 tr |ρ ABE − ρ U ⊗ ρ E | is exponentially small in n, with ρ ABE being the actual joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve; ρ U being an ideal (random, secret, and shared) key distributed to Alice and Bob; and ρ E being the partial trace of ρ ABE over the system AB.
To make reading easier, we use the following notations, where i is the bit string sent by Alice, i B is the bit string received by Bob, and c = i ⊕ i B is the string of errors:
T 1 if |c z | n z ≤ p a,z and |c b | n x ≤ p a,x 0 otherwise (24) In other words, i AB T consists of all the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits of Alice and Bob; and T is the random variable representing the result of the test.
According to the above definitions, the states ρ ABE and ρ U are
where ρ b
x, and Bob (k , that is obtained from x B , ξ = xP T C , and P K ), and subsystem C represents the information published in the unjammable classical channel during the protocol (this information is known to Alice, Bob, and Eve) -namely, i AB T (all the test bits), P (the partition), and ξ = xP T C (the syndrome). We note that in the definition of ρ ABE , we sum only over the events in which the test is passed (namely, in which the protocol is not aborted by Alice and Bob): in such cases, an m-bit key is generated. The cases in which the protocol aborts do not exist in the sum -namely, they are represented by the zero operator, as required by the definition of composable security (see Subsection 1.1 and [12, Subsection 6.1.2]). Thus, ρ ABE is a non-normalized state, and tr(ρ ABE ) is the probability that the test is passed.
To help us bound the trace distance, we define the following intermediate state:
This state is identical to ρ ABE , except that Bob holds the Alice's final key (k) instead of his own calculated final key (k ). In particular, the similarity between ρ ABE and ρ ABE means, by definition, that ρ E tr AB (ρ ABE ) and ρ E tr AB (ρ ABE ) are the same state:
Proposition 4. Under the same conditions as Theorem 3, it holds that
Proof. We notice that in ρ ABE , the only factors depending directly on x and x B (and not only on k and ξ ) are the probability P i, i B , P and Eve's state ρ b
x,x B E . The probability can be reformulated as:
(Because all the possible n-bit values of x have the same probability, 1 2 n ; and because all the r + m rows of the matrices P C and P K are linearly independent, so there are exactly 2 n−r−m values of x corresponding to each specific pair (ξ , k).)
Therefore, the state ρ ABE takes the following form:
We still have to bound the following difference:
Because the trace distance between every two normalized states is bounded by 1, and because of the reliability proof in Subsection 3.5, we get: To sum up, we get the following bound:
This bound is exponentially small in n. Thus, we have proved the composable security of BB84-INFO-z.
Security, Reliability, and Error Rate Threshold
According to Theorem 3 and to the discussion in Subsection 3.5, to get both security and reliability we only need vectors {v n 1 , . . . , v n r n +m n } satisfying both the conditions of the Theorem (distance d rn,mn 2n > δ 2 ≥ p a,x +ε sec ) and the reliability condition (the ability to correct n(p a,z + ε rel ) errors). Such families were proven to exist in Appendix E 2. The exponents of Eve's information (security) and of the failure probability of the error-correcting code (reliability) are different than in [1] , because different numbers of test bits are now allowed (n z and n x are arbitrary). This implies that the exponents may decrease more slowly (or more quickly) as a function of n. However, if we choose n z = n x = n (thus sending N = 3n qubits from Alice to Bob), then we get exactly the same exponents as in [1] .
The asymptotic error rate thresholds found in this paper allow us to tolerate a higher threshold for a specific basis (say, the x basis) if we demand a lower threshold for the other basis (z). If we choose the same error rate threshold for both bases, then the asymptotic bound is 7.56%, exactly the bound found for BB84 in [11] and [1] .
We conclude that even if we change the BB84 protocol to have INFO bits only in the z basis, this does not harm its security and reliability (at least against collective attacks). This does not even change the asymptotic error rate threshold. The only drawbacks of this change are the need to check the error rate for the two bases separately, and the need to either send more qubits (3n qubits in total, rather than 2n) or get a slower exponential decrease of the exponents required for security and reliability.
We thus find that the feature of BB84, that both bases are used for information, is not very important for security and reliability, and that BB84-INFO-z (that lacks this feature) is almost as useful as BB84. This may have important implications on the security and reliability of other protocols that, too, use only one basis for information qubits, such as [14] and some two-way protocols [18, 20] .
We also present a better approach for the proof, that uses the quantum distance between two states rather than the classical information. In [1] , [10] , and [11] , the classical mutual information between Eve's information (after an optimal measurement) and the final key was calculated (by using the trace distance between two quantum states); although we should note that in [1] and [11] , the trace distance was used for the proof of security of a single bit of the final key even when all other bits are given to Eve, and only the last stages of the proof discussed bounding the classical mutual information. In the current paper, on the other hand, we use the trace distance between the two quantum states until the end of the proof, which allows us to prove fully composable security.
Therefore, our proof shows the fully composable security of BB84-INFO-z against collective attacks (and, in particular, security even if Eve keeps her quantum states until she gets more information when Alice and Bob use the key, rather than measuring them at the end of the protocol); and a very similar approach can be applied to [1] , immediately proving the composable security of BB84 against collective attacks. Our proof also makes a step towards making the security proof in [11] (security proof of BB84 against joint attacks) prove the composable security of BB84 against joint attacks.
Our results show that the BB84-INFO-z protocol can be securely used for distributing a secret key; the security is of an ideal implementation and against an adversary limited to collective attacks (it may be possible to generalize the proof, so that it applies to the most general attacks (joint attacks), by using the methods of [11] , but such generalization is beyond the scope of the current paper). Moreover, the security of the final key is universally composable, which means that the key may be used for any cryptographic purpose without harming the security, even if Eve keeps her quantum states and uses all the information she gets in the future in an optimal way.
The techniques described in our proof may be applied in the future for proving the security of other protocols by using similar methods, and, in particular, for proving the security of other QKD protocols that use only one basis for the information bits, such as [14, 18, 20] mentioned above.
We note that our security proof, similarly to many other full security proofs of QKD, assumes an ideal implementation (of ideal quantum systems consisting of exactly one qubit) and theoretical attacks. Practical implementations of QKD, almost always using photons, exist (see [33, 22] for details); their security analysis is much more complicated, because both Alice's photon source and Bob's detector devices have weaknesses and deviations from the theoretical protocol (especially when more than one photon is emitted by Alice or is sent by the eavesdropper). Those imperfections give rise to various practical attacks, such as the "Photon-Number Splitting" attack [34] (in which the eavesdropper takes advantage of emissions of two or more photons by Alice and gets full information) and the "Bright Illumination" attack [35] (in which the eavesdropper takes advantage of a weakness of specific detectors used by Bob and gets full information).
Possible solutions to those problems of actual physical realizations (see [33, 22] for more details) include a much more careful analysis of the practical devices and of practical implementations; "Measurement-Device Independent" QKD protocols [36, 37, 38, 39] , that may be secure even if the measurement devices are controlled by the adversary; and "Device Independent" QKD protocols [40, 41, 42] , that may be secure even if all the quantum devices are controlled by the adversary.
